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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1955
accompanying inventory and appraisal was granted, and where, after the date
certain but before the date of the application, the central office equipment,
including both local and tolling equipment, of one of the important ex-
changes of the applicant was totally destroyed by fire, and a new plant with
different style equipment was constructed, it was not unreasonable or un-
lawful for the commission to hold -that it was not possible to determine
the observed depreciation of the plant and property which was destroyed,
and that the paucity of the evidence in the case prevented the Commission
from arriving at a valuation.
Rates: Unlawful Discrimination Among Customers
On appeal from an order of the Public Utilities Commission approving
an electric company's proposed rate increases, the Supreme Court, in
F. & R. Lazarus & Co. -v. Public Utilities Commission,4 held that while a
public utility furnishing electricity for light, heat, and power may, without
being guilty of unlawful discrimination, classify its customers on any rea-
sonable basis and make separate rates for each class, such utility may charge
only one rate for a particular service, and any discrimination among cus-
tomers as to the rates charged for the same service, under like conditions,
is unreasonable and unlawful.
ROBERT C. BENSING
REAL PROPERTY
Dedication of Highways
Prior Use by Public
The general rule is that until a highway has been dedicated by the owner
of land, the dedication has been accepted by the appropriate govern-
mental unit and the -highway has 'been opened to public travel or the public
has been invited to use the highway, the appropriate governmental unit has
no duty to maintain it.' If, however, the highway is being used by the
public at the time of dedication and acceptance, then the appropriate gov-
ernmental unit has an immediate duty to maintain it. The Court of Ap-
peals for Montgomery County so held in Adamson v. W/etz2 and ordered
the township trustees to remove snow from an unimproved highway and
to drag it in accordance with Ohio Revised Code section 123.
' 162 Ohio St. 223, 122 N.E.2d 783 (1954).
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Deeds
Recorded Plat and Description in Deed Construed Together
In Ruff v. Browns the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants
to quiet the plaintiff's title to two irregular portions of land which the de-
fendants were cultivating. The defendants claimed -itle to the two irregu-
lar portions of land as heirs of George L. Brown. Brown in 1924 owned
a parcel of land of 4.4 acres. He filed a plat of this parcel showing it to
be divided into seventeen lots, an alley in the rear, and two irregular
portions of land, leading from a highway to the alley, which were marked
"reserved." The plat contained the statement that it showed not only the
precise length and width of the lots to be sold by number, but also "all
lands laid out and ... dedicated... for streets for use of the public." The
alley was marked on the plat "16' alley reserved." The court of appeals
properly held that the word "reserved" on each of the two irregular portions
of land did not mean that the owner had reserved title to those portions in
himself, but meant that the owner had dedicated both irregular portions as
public streets.
Eminent Domain
No Proof of Endeavor to Agree on Price
The Ohio Turnpike Act, in order to avoid unnecessary eminent domain
proceedings, requires the Ohio Turnpike Commission to "endeavor to agree
with the owner.., as to the compensation to be paid for the property."4
The Court of Appeals for Williams County properly held that in an eminent
domain proceeding the commission must not only allege that it endeavored
to agree with the owner on a fair price for his land, but the commission
must submit proof of this fact when its allegation is denied by the owner
and the trial court asks for this proof.5
Admissible and Inadmissible Evidence as to Fair Market Value
The rapid change of unimproved rural land to improved urban land has
increased the problem of determining, in eminent domain proceedings, the
fair market value of unimproved land which is suitable for use as a shopping
center, an apartment house or other urban use. The following evidence
'Dayton v. Rhotehamnel, 90 Ohio St. 175, 106 N.E. 967 (1914).
2 124 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio App. 1952).
'98 Ohio App. 326, 129 N.E.2d 389 (1953).
'OHIO REV. CODE § 5537.06.
'In re Appropriation by Ohio Turnpike Corn., 98 Ohio App. 151, 128 N.E.2d 527
(1953).
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may be considered by a jury to determine the fair market value of specific
land: (1) the price paid by the owner if the date of purchase is not too
remote and if conditions with respect to the land have not changed too
greatly and if the trial court cautions the jury that the issue is value at the
rime of taking and not at the time of purchase; (2) the sales price of other
comparable property in the neighborhood; (3) the most valuable uses to
which the land can reasonably and practically be adapted; (4) testimony
by the owner as to the value of his land although he may or may not qualify
as an expert.6
Testimony as to the value of adjoining land or comparable land which
is based upon public records, revenue stamps and the like, is not admissible
in an eminent domain proceeding because it is 'hearsay and unreliable. A
purported financial statement of the owner in which his property and its
value are listed is inadmissible when there is no evidence that the financial
statement was authorized by the owner.7
Drinage Fasement and Damage to Residae
In another eminent domain proceeding the trial court improperly (1)
refused to instruct the jury that the owner is entitled to compensation for
injury to the residue of his property which is directly caused by the taking
and (2) failed to present as a separate issue the determination of damages
for a drainage easement and the injury to the residue because of this
easement.8
No Liability for Relocation of State Highway
The case of 'State v. LinzelP involved the question whether a person
who has a store, filling station and restaurant along a main state highway is
entitled to damages when the main highway is relocated and the older por-
*tion is made a county highway. The owner of the business property suf-
fered a substantial loss upon the relocation of the highway, but there-was
no taking of his property, and therefore the Ohio Supreme Court properly
denied damages for this loss.
Estates
Dedication of Land for "Meeting-Homre And School-House"
In Board of Ed cation v. Unknown Heirs0 the Court of Appeals for
Auglaize County found that the plaintiff Board of Education had the fee
Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Com., 124 N.E.2d 424 (Ohio App. 1955); Ellis v. Ohio
Turnpike Com., 124 NE.2d441 (Ohio App. 1955).
S'Ibid.
'Rockwell v. Ohio Turnpike Com., 98 Ohio App. 199, 128 N.E.2d 834 (1954).
p163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955).
"' 128 N.E.2d 534 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954).
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simple absolute to two lots which according to the original plat of the town
had -been donated by the proprietors in 1833 for a "Meeting-House and
School-House." An Evangelical and Reformed Church claimed one of
these lots as the successor of the German Lutheran Church which received
title to it from plaintiffs predecessor in 1849. The court of appeals based
its decision on alternate grounds. If the original dedication and applicable
statutes or common law principles gave the plaintiff's predecessor the fee
simple, then after the conveyance in 1849 by plaintiff's predecessor to de-
fendant's predecessor there was more than seventy-five years of adverse
possession by the grantor against his grantee. On the other hand if the
plaintiff's predecessor received only a fee simple determinable, then it
obtained the fee -simple absolute by more than seventy-five years of adverse
possession against persons claiming under the original donor. This de-
cision is just because of the length of time involved and the adverse posses-
sion for more than the statutory period.
The sale by a municipality of land dedicated for a specific purpose
within a few years after it has been donated might be possible under Babin
v. Ashland" and Board of Education v. Unknown Heirs,12 and the cases
cited in these two decisions.
The donor who dedicates land for a specific use, such as a public park,
public market, meeting house or school house reasonably expects that the
land will be used for the designated purpose for a considerable length of
time, but hardly forever. In order to protect the donor's reasonable ex-
pectation as to the use of the land it might be well to provide by statute
that land which has been dedicated for general or special public use must
be so used during a stated period of years, for example thirty years, and that
after the expiration of the thirty years the land may :be alienated and used
by the appropriate governmental unit as other land to which it has acquired
the fee simple absolute by purchase. If the land is not used during the
stated period for the designated purpose, it should revert to the donor or
his successors as though it had been conveyed to the governmental unit
in fee simple determinable. The same rule as to duration should apply
to possibilities of reverter and to rights of entry.
13
Charitable Trust
The Probate Court and the Court of Appeals for Franklin County both
construed a testamentary gift of land to Franklin County "for the purpose
of being kept, maintained and operated as a home for old ladies, to be
160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953).
"128 N.E.2d 534 (Ohio Com. PI. 1954).
See Hammond, Limitations upon Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry,
CuRREN TRENDS IN LEGISLATION 1953-1954, 589 (1955).
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known as the 'Elizabeth Morton Fink Home"' as a charitable trust and not
as a gift of the fee simple absolute.14 The Prosecuting Attorney for Frank-
lin County had advised the Board of County Commissioners that it could
accept the land without meeting the terms of the will. He based -his opinion
on cases involving conditions subsequent in deeds which the court of ap-
peals properly stated are not controlling.
Joint Tenancy
Ever since the early case of Sergeant v. Steiaberger'5 there has been con-
siderable difference of opinion among Ohio lawyers whether the concurrent
estate of joint tenancy can be created in Ohio land. 6 It has been stated
that joint tenancy cannot be created,'17 and it has also been stated that joint
tenancy can be created by the use of apt words of survivorship. 18
Some attorneys who state that joint tenancy exists in Ohio may be
referring to "joint tenancy" with respect to bank accounts. The agreement
between the bank and the persons establishing a joint account frequently
states that the account is held by them as "joint tenants with right of surviv-
orship and not as tenants in common." Consequently, persons who have
these joint accounts are sometimes called joint tenants. However, the rights
of these depositors are based upon a contract which often provides that
either of them may withdraw the entire deposit. They are not joint tenants
within the original meaning of the concurrent ownership of land or per-
sonal property as joint tenants.
Some attorneys may describe persons who hold land under a survivor-
ship deed as joint tenants. The Ohio courts have -been able to continue for
a long time the mystery as to how the survivor takes under a survivorship
deed. They simply say that the survivor takes, without stating that he takes
as the surviving joint tenant; as a remainderman or as the owner of an
executory interest.
The Common Pleas Court for Licking County in Cleaver v. Long 9 states
that when a husband owns an interest in land, and the husband and wife
convey to themselves as joint tenants with right of survivorship they become
joint tenants. Although the fact situation before the court in this case is
not dearly stated in its opinion, apparently either the husband or wife died
I'Lewis v. Board of County Com'rs., 98 Ohio App. 192, 128 N.E.2d 818 (1954).
"2 Ohio 305 (1826).
1
'Note, 3 WES'mUnN RES. L Rnv. 60 (1951).
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY S 66, comment a, Special Note (1936). McDeRMoTr,
OHIo REAL PROPERTY LAW AN) PRACnCE S 29.01 c (1950). 1 HAUSSER, OHIO
PRACrCE S 612 (1952).
12CONWAY, BRiuF ON CONCURRENT OwNERsIP 57 (1938).
1126 N.E.2d 479 (Ohio Corn. PL 1955).
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first, and the issue was whether the survivor received the entire interest con-
veyed by both to themselves as joint tenants, including the right of sur-
vivorship. Unfortunately, since the survivor might take as a remainderman
or as the owner of an executory interest, the decision can be explained
without recognizing joint tenancy.
There are situations in addition to that of co-trustees when joint ten-
ancy is desirable. For example, when a person who pays the full price for
land takes title in the name of himself and another as joint tenants with
right of survivorship, their estate should be recognized by the Ohio courts
as a joint tenancy so that when both are living, either may convey an un-
divided half interest to a third person and thereby destroy the right of
survivorship. A statute recognizing joint tenancy in Ohio would clarify
the law and add a form of co-ownership which is desirable under certain
circumstances.
Liens
Federal Taxes, County Taxes, Mortgages, Judgments
Section 5719.25 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that state taxes,
including county taxes, have priority over all other liens. The United States
law provides that federal tax liens are prior to all other liens except those
of mortgages and judgment creditors.
The Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County, in an action to foreclose
a mortgage, directed payment of the various liens in the following order
after payment of costs: county taxes, mortgage, judgment, federal taxes.
The court of appeals modified the method of distributing the proceeds from
the sale of the property. It directed payment of the county taxes and a
pro rata reduction of the liens of the mortgage and judgment to give effect
to the state law and the federal law. This modification increased by the
amount of the county taxes ($338.39) the share payable to the United
States and decreased on a pro rata basis in the same amount the shares
payable to the mortgagee and the judgment creditor.20
Purchaser's Equitable Lien for The Amount Paid on Purchase Price
The Ohio Supreme Court properly held in The Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Bouse2l that when a vendor breaches an executory contract to convey land,
the purchaser is entitled to an equitable lien on the land for the amount he
has paid on the purchase price. The headnote of this case does not state
that the purchaser must be in possession to assert his equitable lien. How-
' Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 125 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio App.
1955).
2' 163 Ohio St. 392, 127 N.E.2d 7 (1955).
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ever, the Ohio Supreme Court in its opinion states that since the purchaser
alleged that she was in possession of a portion of the land at the time the
plaintiff mortgagee instituted his foreclosure action to which the purchaser
later became a party, the court did not have to determine whether a pur-
chaser who had never been in possession is entitled to this equitable lien.
he purchaser's equitable lien is one which arises from the- equities
of the situation and not from the fact that the purchaser is in possession.
It would be unreasonable to require a purchaser to be in possession in order
to assert -his equitable lien against a defaulting vendor. The vendor may
refuse to convey title because he desires to remain in possession.
An equitable lien cannot be asserted against a bona fide purchaser or
bona fide mortgagee. In order to avoid a possible decision that the equita-
ble lien may be asserted against a judgment creditor without notice, the
judgment creditor should be given by statute the same protection as a bona
fide purchaser. This protection should be granted to all judgment creditors
whether the judgment is based upon a new or an antecedent debt and
against secret legal as well as equitable liens and interests.
Equitable Lien of Vendor's Assignee for Unpaid Purchase Price
The judgment creditor in Ohio has not been granted by statute the
same protection as bona fide purchasers.2 2 Therefore, if a vendor of land
assigns to a third person for value his rights under a contract of sale and
conveys his legal title to this third person who does not record the deed, a
judgment obtained against the vendor after this conveyance and assign-
ment is not a lien on the land. It should be immaterial, therefore, that the
vendor neglects to convey the legal tide to the person to whom he assigns
for value his contractual rights as vendor, unless section 5301.26 of the
Ohio Revised Code provides otherwise. This section states that a vendor's
"lien shall not be effective as against a purchaser, mortgagee, judgment
creditor, or other encumbrancer, unless there is a recital or a reservation of
the lien in the deed, or in some instrument of record executed with the
same formalities as are required for the execution of deeds and mortgages
of land." This statute was passed to change the rule that a vendor's secret,
equitable lien prevailed over -the lien of a judgment against the purchaser
who was the record owner.23
In Butcher -v. Kagey Lumber Co.24 a majority of the Ohio Supreme
Court strictly construed section 5301.26 of the Ohio Revised Code by
" OHio REV. CODE S 2329.02 (a judgment is a "lien upon lands and tenements of
each judgment debtor'); S 5301.25 (subsequent bona fide purchasers protected
against unrecorded deeds).
Miller v. Albright, 60 Ohio St. 48, 53 N.E. 490 (1899).
164 Ohio St. 85, 128 N.E.2d 54 (1955).
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restricting its application to situations where the vendor has conveyed title
to the purchaser and has an equitable vendor's lien for the unpaid pur-
chase price. When a vendor has not conveyed title to land to the purchaser,
the vendor has no vendor's lien -because he has the title. If, as in Butcher
v. Kagey Lumber Co. the vendor assigns for value -his contractual rights,
he should be considered a trustee of the legal title for his assignee and for
the purchaser in accordance with their respective interests. Consequently,
the vendor's assignee has the superior right to the legal title as against a
subsequent judgment creditor whose rights can be no greater than the
rights of his debtor, the vendor.
The modern trend is to give judgment creditors without notice the
same statutory protection as bona fide purchasers against unrecorded deeds
and liens. The three dissenting judges in Butcher v. Kagey Lumber Co.
were probably motivated by this trend and by a general dislike of secret
liens. The question whether the vendor's assignee would have been pro-
tected if the purchaser had not been in possession is not answered by the
court.
If Ohio judgment creditors without notice were protected -by statute,
would the court have considered the possession of the purchaser notice to
subsequent judgment creditors, of the equitable lien of the vendor's as-
signee?
Navigable Waters
Boating for Pleasure
Navigable waters were formerly defined as waters suitable for com-
mercial use, because one of the principal forms of transportation in our
early history was by water. Today large numbers of pleasure boats of vary-
ing sizes and kinds are owned by rich and poor. Also, a considerable
number of persons make their living by renting boats to others.
In Coleman v. Schaeffet 25 the defendants, father and son, owned land
on each side of the mouth of Beaver Creek where it enters Lake Erie. De-
fendants constructed a fence and steel cables across the mouth of this stream
so that it was impossible for the plaintiff who rents boats to go by boat
from his land to the lake or from the lake to his land. The trial court and
the court of appeals both rejected plaintiff's request for a mandatory in-
junction to compel defendants to remove the barriers across the mouth
of the stream. However, the Ohio Supreme Court emphasized the change
in the concept of navigability to include boating for pleasure as well as for
profit and to include water to which the only access by the public is by other
' 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 (1955).
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water. The Ohio Supreme Court therefore ordered the removal of the
barriers.
Prescription
Use of Common Driveway for More Than
Twenty-One Years Under Oral Agreement
About 1925 two friendly neighbors, pursuant to an oral agreement,
built a common cement driveway centered on the boundary of their lots.
In 1948 one of these neighbors sold his lot, and in the same year the other
neighbor died intestate. The purchasers of the one lot brought an action
in 1951 to enjoin the heirs who inherited the other lot from using the com--
mon driveway. In Shanks v. Floom26 the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
the decisions of the lower courts that each of the original neighbors had
acquired by adverse use of the common driveway for more than twenty-one
years an easement in the other neighbor's land. This decision is proper2 7
If the adverse use in Shanks v. Floom 'had been for a period less than
twenty-one years, would the Ohio courts have recognized the rule that
where there has been substantial reliance on an oral license to use the land
of another the licensor will be estopped from revoking the license for what-
ever period may -be necessary to protect this reliance? Until 1908 substan-
tial reliance on an oral license to use the property of another was protected
by the Ohio court.2 8 In that year the earlier law was overruled by Yeager
v. Tuning.29 Whether Ohio should return to its former rule and protect a
licensee who has relied substantially on an oral license to use the land of
another is a question which the Ohio Supreme Court should consider seri-
ously when a case of this type arises in which a proper decision cannot
be reached on the theory of adverse use.a
No Right to Pollute Stream May Be Acquired by Prescription
The pollution of streams is a very serious matter today, though years
ago it may not have been considered very objectionable 31
In 1948 the federal government adopted the Water Pollution Control
Act3 2 which provides for federal assistance to states in the prevention and
162 Ohio St. 479, 124 N.E.2d 416 (1955).
='Recent Decision, 16 Omo ST. L. J. 441 (1955); Note, 27 A L R 2d 332 (1953).
' Wilson v. Chalfant, 15 Ohio 248 (1846).
' 79 Ohio St. 121, 86 N.E. 657 (1908).
20See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, § 519 (4) (1944).
t1 THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCEs COMMISSION, A
WATER POLICY FOR THE AMmucAN PEOPLE 185 (1950).
m33 U.S.C. §§ 466-466J (1952).
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reduction of stream pollution. Ohio and other states adopted legislation
and entered into regional compacts to prevent and to reduce the pollution
of streams.33 Section 6111.04 of the Ohio Revised Code states that the
unauthorized pollution of a stream is a public nuisance.
The plaintiff, the owner of a farm adjoining Paint Creek, sought, in
Weade v. Washington,3 4 damages of five thousand dollars because the de-
fendant city polluted Paint Creek with its sewage. The defendant city
failed twice to properly plead as a defense its acquisition by prescription
of a right to pollute Paint Creek. Each time the common pleas court
not only found that the defendant's pleading was inadequate but also stated
that in Ohio no one can acquire by prescription the right to pollute a stream.
It is important to know that a defendant who relies on prescription must
plead that during the full twenty-one year period his adverse use was of
the same degree as he relies upon as a defense. But, it is more important to
know whether in Ohio a right to pollute a stream may be acquired by pre-
scription. The dictum in Vian v. The Sheffield Building & Developmen
Co.,3 upon which the common pleas court relied in Wleade v. Washington
reads:
The law of Ohio, however, seems to be dear to the effect that one may
not obtain by prescription, or otherwise than by purchase, a right to cast
sewage upon the lands of another without his consent.
The cases cited as authority for this dictum are nor directly in point.36
Also, the dictum itself is not directly in point because it relates solely to
casting sewage upon the lands of another which is not the same as pollut-
ing the stream which runs through or by a plaintiff's land.
The defendant in Weade v. Washington relied upon the case of Cleve-
land v. Standard Bag and Paper Co.37 to sustain its position that a munici-
pality can acquire by prescription the right to pollute a stream. However,
this case is not directly in point because the plaintiff Standard Bag and
oHio Rnv. CODE 5 6111.01 et seq.
'128 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955); 129 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio Com. P1. 1955).
"85 Ohio App. 191, 198, 88 N.E.2d 410, 414 (1948).
"Bucyrus v. State Dept. of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929). (After
adoption of Article XVIII of Ohio Constitution, the state retained police power to
regulate sewage disposal by municipalities into streams, and no municipality can
acquire as against the state a prescriptive right to pollute a stream); State v. Wil-
liams, 120 Ohio St. 432, 166 N.E. 377 (1929) (Mandamus to compel compliance
with orders of state health department as to disposal of sewage to prevent pollution
of stream); Kasch v. Akron, 100 Ohio St. 229, 126 N.E. 61 (1919) (Municipality
must acquire by purchase or appropriation the right to construct sanitary sewer across
private property); Mansfield v. Balliert, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902) (Mu-
nicipality liable for polluting stream ran through plaintiff's farms; no prior pollution
for prescriptive period).
"72 Ohio St. 324, 74 N.E. 206 (1905).
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Paper Company was also polluting the stream with its sewage and in-
dustrial waste. The opinion of the court and the headnote clearly state
that the decision is based on the fact that plaintiff company was also pollut-
ing the stream as well as the fact that defendant city had been polluting the
stream ("pubic open sewer") for more than twenty-one years.
This brief review of the Ohio decisions indicates that the Ohio Supreme
Court may and probably will decide, when a proper case comes before it,
that no one in Ohio can obtain by prescription the right to pollute a stream.
The court can support such a decision not only by a strong, modern policy
against open sewers and the pollution of streams, but also by respectable
authority.as
Regional Planning
Location of Electric Power Lines
A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Ohio Power Co.31
sustained the power of a regional planning commission to include in its
plan the location and construction of electric power lines. The fundamental
difference between the majority and the dissenters in this case probably
stems from a disagreement on policy. The majority believed that regional
planning would be seriously hampered if the regional planning commis-
sion had no authority over the location and construction of electric power
lines; the dissenting judges believed that the various regional planning
commissions may place "a great burden of local controls upon statewide
and interstate facilities." The answer of the majority to the dissenters'
objection is that the power company may test the reasonableness of any
decision of the regional planning commission by an appeal to the courts.
It is significant that the majority opinion includes "civic beauty" as
one of the objectives of planning.
Being convinced of the desirability of regional planning, the majority
of the court had no difficulty in construing the phrase "systems of trans-
portation" in section 713.23 of the Ohio Revised Code as including elec-
tric power lines. The dissenters, on the other hand, who believed the
plans of the power company were more likely to benefit the state than the
individual plans of many regional planning commissions, had no difficulty
in construing the phrase "systems of transportation" as not including elec-
tric power lines.
""By the prevailing view [prescriptive) rights cannot arise with respect to public
nuisances, or with respect to special injuries resulting therefrom to private persons."
6A Am. Law of Property 91 (1954).
1163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E.2d 394 (1955).
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Restrictions
Provision For Amendment by Designated Agency
and Reqidfement of Approval of Bmilding Plans
There is a definite trend in federal, state, and local legislation and in
land restrictions to promote the building of beautiful neighborhoods. The
United States Supreme Court in upholding the District of Columbia Rede-
velopment Act of 1945 said: "It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."4 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance which provided
that a proposed structure must not be so at variance with the exterior
architectural appeal of neighboring structures as to cause a substantial de-
preciation in the property values of the neighborhood. 41 The Franklin
County Common Pleas Court, in line with this modern trend and Dixon v.
Van Sweringen Co.4 2 upheld land restrictions which provided that they
could be modified by the Fairfax Community Association, which imposed
the restrictions, and that plans for "any building, fence, wall, or other
structure" to be erected on the restricted land must be approved by this
association.43  The validity of these provisions of the restrictions was
raised because in 1953 the Association adopted a regulation requiring all
one story homes to have a minimum inside floor area of 1,400 square feet.
The Association refused to approve defendan's plans for a one story home
of less than 1,400 square feet. When the construction of this home was
started without the approval of the Association, it had the common pleas
court enjoin construction of the home. The common pleas court stated
that whenever a designated agency reserves or is given the power to change
land restrictions it must not do so in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
and, in approving or disapproving plans for a structure, it must act in ac-
cordance with a general plan and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
This decision is sound. It should be of considerable value to attorneys who
desire the flexibility which is possible when land restrictions may be
modified and plans of structures must be approved by a designated agency.
ROBERT N. COOK
'
0 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
"State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 269, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955). See Note, Esthetic
Zoning -The Trend of Law, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 171 (1956).
' 121 Ohio St. 56, 166 N.E. 887 (1929).
"Fairfax Community Association v. Boughton, 127 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Com. P1.
1955).
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